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Abstract
There are now several proposals for introducing random elements
into the process of funding allocation for research, and some initial
implementation of this policy by funding bodies. The proposals have
been supported on efficiency grounds, with models, including social
epistemology models, showing random allocation could increase the
generation of significant truths in a community of scientists when
compared to funding by peer review. The models in the literature are,
however, fairly abstract (by necessity). This paper introduces some of
the considerations that are required to build on the modelling work
towards a fully-fledged policy proposal, including issues of cost and
fairness.
Introduction
Proposal to fund science, at least in part, by random allocation, have been
made both within philosophy of science (Gillies, 2014; Avin, 2015) and in
other fields (Greenberg, 1998; Brezis, 2007; Graves et al., 2011; Fang and
Casadevall, 2016). There are now at least three major funders who allocate
a portion of their funds through a process that involves random selection:
the Health Research Council of New Zealand’s “Explorer Grants” (Health
Research Council of New Zealand, 2017), New Zealand’s Science for Technol-
ogy Innovation “Seed Projects” (Science for Technological Innovation, 2017)
and the Volkswagen Foundation’s “Experiment!” grants (VolkswagenStiftung,
2017).
These policies are supported, at least in part, by modelling work (Brezis,
2007; Avin, 2017) that shows how introducing a random element to the
funding process performs better than the current best practice of grant peer
review, which allocates funds by relying entirely on expert judgement based
on past experience.1 These models highlight the value of random allocation
in allowing greater exploration of the space of possible projects. At the
same time, they portray tradeoffs between this increased exploration rate and
the efficiency gains that come from relying on past experience and expert
evaluation. Indeed, the main contribution of these models, it would seem, is
in fixing the concepts required for evaluating these two causal processes, and
the tradeoff between them. Unsurprisingly, they abstract away much of the
remaining context of science funding policy. This paper, then, aims to fill in
some of this missing context, so that policy makers and interested academics
who are convinced by the key message of these models (or any of the other
arguments supporting funding by random allocation) can start turning the
proposals sketched by the models into actual policy recommendations.
In §1 I will review existing evidence for the cost and accuracy of grant peer
review. In §2 I will review theoretical considerations relating to the use of
lotteries in other domains (admissions and distribution of goods). §3 presents
a proposal for how a science funding lottery might be run in practice, while
taking into consideration desiderata and constraints raised by the previous
two sections. In §4 I consider some limitations which define areas where
funding by lottery is unlikely to be the best policy.
1 Empirical evidence for problems with allo-
cation by peer review
The first step in bringing the random allocation proposal into the context of
contemporary science policy is to ask what problems with current allocation
mechanisms the policy may solve. The current dominant mechanism for
allocating public funding to research projects is grant peer review, where
proposals are invited from practising scientists, and these proposals are then
evaluated by scientific peers for merit. Funding is allocated according to this
1These modelling results overlap, to some extent, with agent based models of publication
peer review (Zollman, 2009; Thurner and Hanel, 2011; Squazzoni and Gandelli, 2013; Bianchi
and Squazzoni, 2015), though the difference in context between grant peer review and
publication peer review is significant, for example in the role played by uncertainty.
2
peer evaluation, from the most meritorious downwards until the funds run out.
Opinions about the merits of the peer review system, and its shortcomings,
are numerous and varied.2 Empirical evaluations of aspects of the system are
more rare (Demicheli and Di Pietrantonj, 2007), but stand to provide a clearer
insight into what might be deficient in the peer review system, and where
introduction of random elements may improve the system by simultaneously
increasing the eventual impact3 is in contrast to treating impact only within
the of projects selected and by reducing the cost of operating the funding
mechanism. Two such studies are presented below: the first looks at the level
of randomness already present in the peer review system; the second looks at
the cost of running the peer review evaluation.
1.1 Measuring the variability of peer review scores
How can we measure the effectiveness of peer review? One fairly good
measure would be to compare the scores of reviewers to the actual impact
of funded projects. Such a measurement would give us an estimate of the
validity of the merit scores assigned by reviewers. However, the ability to
conduct such studies is very limited. For example, Dinges (2005) conducted an
evaluation study of the Austrian science fund (FWF), using data gathered by
FWF regarding funded projects, including publication record, employment of
researchers and staff, and an ex post evaluation of the projects by anonymous
peers. Nonetheless, Dinges is very explicit about the limitations of this kind
of study:
• Information is only available about funded projects. Thus, there is
no way of evaluating whether the system is effective at funding the
best proposals, only the extent to which funding the chosen projects
produced a benefit. Thus, it cannot help chose between substantially
different methods of funding; at best, it can provide justification for
2For a positive evaluation see Polanyi (1962); Frazier (1987); Research Councils UK
(2006). For criticisms see Chubin and Hackett (1990); Martino (1992); Gillies (2008, 2014).
3Given the context of public funding of science, I will use the term impact to mean the
causal consequences of research that eventually (though possibly with much downstream
effort and delay) contribute to social well-being, which I consider to be the core reason for
public support of science. This is in contrast to causal effects that are entirely contained
within academia, which are predominantly the ones captured by metrics such as number of
citations.
3
having public funding of science at all, and perhaps propose small
tweaks to the current system.
• The ex post evaluations of projects’ success and impacts were carried
out by the same experts who evaluated the project proposals and who
contributed to the funding decisions, which is likely to lead to significant
positive bias.
• Measurements of publications and citations (bibliometrics) are poor indi-
cators when applied across multiple disciplines and fields, as publication
and citation practices vary significantly. Public science funding bodies
often support a range of disciplines, or large heterogeneous disciplines,
and so direct use of metrics in ex post evaluation would prove tricky.4
• There are no established indicators for measuring the impact of science.
The indicators that exist in the literature are dominantly economic,
and are ill-suited to measuring the impact of basic research. In a ta-
ble adapted from Godin and Dore´ (2004), Dinges (pp. 20-21) lists 61
different types of possible indicators for scientific impact, the majority
of which are not currently measured. Furthermore, problems of opera-
tionalisation and measurement are likely to be present for many of the
proposed indicators, due to their intangible or subjective nature.
The above list is not exhaustive, but it is sufficient for establishing the
difficulty, at least at present, of directly measuring the effectiveness of funding
methods in generating positive societal impacts, and the related difficulty of
comparing alternative funding methods with regards to their primary function
of choosing the best research.
A weaker evaluation of the validity of the scores of peer review is to
check their consistency: to what extent different panel members agree among
themselves about the merit of individual projects. Such a measurement is
clearly more limited in what it tells us about the reliability of peer review.
Assume (unrealistically) that there is some true measure of the merit of a
4Eugenio Petrovich has kindly pointed out to me that in response to this challenge,
the field of bibliometrics has been developing normalised citation scores, for example the
Mean Normalised Citation Score (MNCS) used by the CWTS Leiden Ranking (CWTS,
2017). However, such normalised indicators have also been criticised, e.g. by Leydesdorff
and Opthof (2010). More generally, the need for dynamic indicators, and for caution in
application across fields and for evaluation, are key tenants of the Leiden manifesto (Hicks
et al., 2015).
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proposed project in the same way there is a true measure of the length of
a stick, neglecting for now the inherent value-laden and dynamic aspects of
scientific merit. We can then treat each reviewer’s evaluation as an estimate
of that measure, with some possible random error and some possible bias, as
if each reviewer’s assessment is analogous to an independent measurement
with a different ruler. Since there is no external measure of project merit, as
discussed above, we can never rule out the possibility that a systematic bias
is operating on all reviewers, such that close agreement between reviewers is
no guarantee of a reliable measure (all our rulers might be wrongly marked
in the same way). A wide spread of scores, while telling us nothing about
bias, will give us an indication that each individual estimate is subject to
large variability (we will know that something is amiss with our rulers if
consecutive measurements yield very different results). In the case of peer
assessment, we can hypothesise that the source of any observed variability is
due either to objective uncertainty, objective differences between reviewers’
experience, or subjective differences between reviewers’ interests and values.
In this scenario of a simple measurement, increasing the number of estimates
will increase the reliability of the mean. Therefore, an estimate of variability
will indicate the number of reviewers required to make a reliable estimate of
the merit of each project. Alternatively, the variability can indicate the level
of (un)reliability (only due to error, not bias) of mean scores given a certain
number of reviewers.
The most thorough measurement published to date of the variability of
grant peer review scores was conducted by Graves et al. (2011).5 The authors
used the raw peer review scores assigned by individual panel members to
2705 grant proposals. All proposals were submitted to the National Health
and Medical Research Council of Australia (NHMRC) in 2009. The scores
were given by reviewers sitting on panels of seven, nine, or eleven members,
and the average score of the panel was used to decide whether a project was
funded or not, based on its rank relative to other proposals.
The authors used a bootstrap method to obtain an estimate of variability
of the mean of peer review scores from the available raw scores.6 In this
method, a set of bootstrap samples, often 1,000-10,000, are obtained from
5An earlier review paper by Cicchetti (1991) covers various measurements with smaller
sample sizes. The paper, published alongside insightful reviewers’ comments, is rich in
discussion of the evidence available at the time, and the statistical tools suitable for this
kind of measurement.
6For an introduction to bootstrap methods see Davison and Hinkley (1997).
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the original sample (in this case, the raw scores of a single proposal), by
randomly selecting scores from the original raw scores with repetition, until a
set of the same size is obtained. For example, if an original set of raw scores
was {3, 3, 4, 4, 6, 7, 9}, giving an average of 5.14, one of the bootstrap samples
might be {3, 4, 4, 4, 6, 9, 9}, giving an average of 5.57, but not {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9},
as 5 and 8 did not appear in the original panel scores. Due to the random
sampling, the likelihood of any score appearing in a bootstrap sample is related
to the number of appearances it had in the original panel, so in the example
above any individual score in any bootstrap sample is twice as likely to be 3 or
4 than 6, 7 or 9. The set of bootstrap samples is then used as a proxy for the
population of possible samples, yielding a mean and a variance in that mean,
and a confidence interval around the mean. This confidence interval, labeled
by the authors the “score interval”, was then compared to the funding cutoff
line: proposals whose score interval was consistently above or consistently
below the funding line were considered “efficiently classified” by the review
system, whereas proposals whose score interval straddled the funding line were
considered as problematic, or “variably/randomly classified”. A bootstrap
method was chosen because the sample sizes are small, prohibiting the use of
more direct estimations of variability, and because the underlying distribution
of potential review scores is unknown, and cannot be assumed to be Gaussian.
The results of this bootstrap method showed that overall, 61% of proposals
were never funded (score interval was consistently below the funding line),
9% were always funded (score interval consistently above the funding line),
and 29% were sometimes funded (score interval straddling the funding line).
In the authors’ opinion, the discrepancy between the observed levels of
variability, and the importance of funding decisions to individuals’ careers,
is cause for concern. The authors claim the results show “a high degree of
randomness”, with “relatively poor reliability in scoring” (p. 3). The authors
follow with a list of possible improvements to the peer review system. One of
their suggestions is to investigate the use of a (limited) lottery:
Another avenue for investigation would be to assess the formal
inclusion of randomness. There may be merit in allowing panels
to classify grants into three categories: certain funding, certain
rejection, or funding based on a random draw for proposals that
are difficult to discriminate. (Graves et al., 2011, p. 4)
Despite their concern, the authors do not offer a hypothesis for the
origin of high variability (though a later paper, discussed below, does offer
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such a hypothesis). Given the existing modelling literature, one reasonable
explanation would be that the variable scores are assigned to proposals
outside of the past experience, or “vision range”, of reviewers. Other possible
explanations would be that reviewers have varying subjective preferences with
which they evaluate proposals, or different views of the relevant scientific
discipline which they were not able to commensurate while on the panel, or
that reviewers vary in their ability (cognitive or other) to evaluate the merit of
a project given a written description and a knowledge of the scientific discipline.
An experiment run by Boudreau et al. (2016), in which “vision distance” was
directly measured, suggests that the effect of increased conceptual distance is
to introduce bias rather than uncertainty, with degree of uncertainty remaining
roughly constant, and similar in magnitude to that found by Graves et al.
Boudreau et al. (2016) broke down “vision distance” into two components:
“evaluator distance”, the degree of content similarity between a reviewer’s area
of expertise and the area of the proposal, and “proposal novelty”, the degree
of content similarity between the proposal and all known works in the area of
the proposal. They used overlap of standardised keywords, assigned by an
independent librarian, to measure these distances.
The above quote from Graves et al suggests the authors see a link between
variability in scores and a (limited) use of a lottery in funding. While this is
not the line taken by the authors, this link can be made even more suggestive,
if we think of the workings of current funding panels as if they were an
implementation of the system described in the quote. If we black box the
workings of the panel, and just look at the inputs and outputs, we see 100%
of the applications coming in, the top 10% or so coming out as “effectively”
funded, the lower half or so being “effectively” rejected, and the middle group
being subjected to some semi-random process. Even if we look into the black
box, we can see that the process of expert deliberation, when applied to the
middle group, bears strong resemblance to the process of a random number
generator: it is highly variable and largely unpredictable. Specifically, and
importantly, the psychological and social deliberation process for the middle
group resembles the operation of a “true” or “physical” random number
generator, such as a lottery ball machine or a quantum measurement. In such
a setup, the unpredictability of the mechanism is due to high complexity or
an inherent unknowable nature of the system.7
7These random generators are different from pseudorandom number generators, such as
the algorithms in operation in computers and pocket calculators, which rely on well-studied
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Thus, we could conclude that funding by peer review is funding by triage,
with random allocation for the middle group. However, there are three
distinct differences between peer review and triage with formal randomness:
the cost of the operation, the appearance of randomness, and the agency of
the reviewers.
1.2 Measuring the cost of grant peer review
The cost of the grant peer review system can be broken down into three
components:
1. The cost of writing the applications (both successful and unsuccessful),
incurred by the applicants.
2. The cost of evaluating the proposals and deciding on which application
to fund, incurred by internal and external reviewers.
3. The administrative costs of the process, incurred by the funding body.
According to Graves et al. (2011), in the funding exercise discussed above
the largest of these costs was, by far, the cost incurred by the applicants,
totalling 85% of the total cost of the exercise (p. 3). The authors used full
costing of the review process and administration budget, but only a small
sample of applicant reports. To complete their data, a more comprehensive
survey was conducted amongst the researchers who submitted applications
to NHMRC in March, 2012. The results of this survey, discussed below, are
reported in Herbert et al. (2013).
The authors received responses from 285 scientists who submitted in total
632 proposals. These provide a representative sample of the 3570 proposals
sent to NHMRC in March 2012, and display the same success rate of 21%.
Based on the survey results the authors estimated, with a high degree of
confidence, that 550 working years went into writing the proposals for the
March 2012 funding round. When monetised based on the researchers’ salaries,
this is equivalent to 14% of the funding budget of NHMRC. New proposals
took on average 38 days to prepare, and resubmissions took on average 28
days. The average length of a proposal was 80-120 pages.
mathematical systems that guarantee high variability and equal chances to all possible
outcomes. For an introduction to random number generators see Knuth (1997, Vol. 2).
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Using survey data, the authors also tried to detect a correlation between
extra time spent on a proposal and the proposal’s likelihood of being funded.
Surprisingly, no such correlation was found, and given the power of the study
this suggests that, on average, 10 extra days spent on a proposal are likely to
at most increase the likelihood of success by 2.8% (p. 3). The authors did
find a statistically significant correlation between the probability of success
and whether the proposal was a resubmission of a previous (failed) proposal:
resubmissions were less likely to be funded, on average, when compared to
new proposals.8
The authors’ recommendations are largely unsurprising given the findings:
time wasted should be reduced by having multiple funding rounds with in-
creasing information requirements, and there should be an exclusion period for
failed applications before they can be resubmitted. What is more interesting
is the authors’ conceptualisation of their findings. The authors hypothesise
the existence of a curve which associates the accuracy of the peer review
system in evaluating the merit of a proposal to the amount of information
provided by each applicant (Fig. 1, in black).
The hypothetical graph of Herbert et al. has certain interesting features:
• The graph hypothesises the existence of an “ideal”, which is the amount
of information required for the optimal level of accuracy. In the paper
this level of accuracy appears close to, though not equal to, 100%.
• In the area left of the “ideal”, i.e. where the information provided is
less than the ideal amount, the graph displays diminishing returns, such
that equal increases in information provided result in less increase in
accuracy the more information has already been provided.
• In the area right of the “ideal”, the graph displays an “overshoot”
effect, with accuracy decreasing as information increases. In the text,
this is explained as the reviewers being overburdened with too much
information.
8The authors do not provide a hypothesis to account for this observation. We could
hypothesise that a significant portion of failed proposals represent low merit projects within
the visibility range of the scientific discipline. Since, over a short period of time, significant
gain of scientific potential is more rare than significant loss of scientific potential (as the
field progresses it “exhausts” the area of familiar projects), what is once labelled as low
merit (if within the vision range) is likely to be similarly labelled in subsequent years, until
a rare breakthrough re-infuses the exhausted field with new potential.
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Figure 1: The accuracy of peer review assessment as a function of information
provided. Original figure, in black, is reproduced from Herbert et al. (2013,
Fig. 2, p. 5), and represents the authors’ hypothesis, not a conclusion
from their data. The red dashed curve was added by me, and represents an
alternative dependance. Herbert et al. (2013) was published under CC-BY-NC
licence: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/legalcode.
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The authors rely on their result, that no statistically significant correlation
was found between extra time spent on a proposal and its likelihood of success,
to argue that the current amount of information provided is more than the
ideal. However, one does not follow the other, because increased accuracy does
not imply higher merit for a proposal. Nonetheless, the authors’ description
of reviewers having to read 50-100 proposals of 80-120 pages does suggest
an unnecessary cognitive burden. Based on their hypothetical curve, the
authors’ suggestions for reducing the amount of information gathered implies
a lower accuracy for the peer review system. The authors believe this lowered
accuracy is justified, on cost/benefit grounds, even though in their model a
high level of accuracy is possible. However, given the sceptical arguments
about reviewer’s accuracy (Gillies, 2014), it is quite possible that a high level
of accuracy is not even possible, and therefore requiring scientists to provide
less information is not only an efficient compromise, it is in fact epistemically
optimal (Fig. 1, dashed red curve).
2 Theoretical background on lotteries
Lotteries have been used in the past, and in some cases are still being used,
for distributing various goods, such as the right to rule, money prizes, hunting
permits, admittance to sought-after schools and university courses, citizenship,
and many more, as well as various “bads”, such as military draft or jury duty.9
The prevalence of lotteries and their unique features have generated various
theoretical works in political theory, economics, and moral philosophy.10
This section presents two theoretical investigations of the use of lotteries
for cases which bear some, though only partial, similarity to the case of
science funding. Partial similarities would have to suffice, as there has been
no comprehensive theoretical study on the use of lotteries for science funding.
9A comprehensive and well-researched list of current and past lotteries is available on
the website of the Kleroterians, a society of scholars advocating the exploration of the use
of lotteries (Boyle, 2013).
10Books of note on the topic of lotteries include Boyle (2010); Duxbury (1999); Gataker
and Boyle (2008); Goodwin (2005); Stone (2011).
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2.1 Introducing lotteries to selection mechanisms of
individuals by organisations
Boyle (1998) proposed, in a paper presented to the Royal Society of Statisti-
cians, that graduated lotteries be introduced into processes where individuals
are selected by organisations based on fallible measurement criteria, in order
to increase the fairness of the process without significant loss of efficiency.
Boyle develops this idea from the Victorian economist and statistician Edge-
worth (1888, 1890), who in a couple of papers discussed the random element
in the allocation of grades in university exams, and the potential benefit of
introducing a weighted lottery based on the results of a “light” examina-
tion (of an unspecified nature) in the selection of candidates to civil service
positions, instead of using the results of university exams. It is assumed
that the exam cannot be improved, or if the exam is improved, its best form
will still involve some residual random element. In Edgeworth’s proposal,
students just above and below the cutoff line will be given a number of lottery
tickets corresponding to the probability that they deservedly belong above
the cutoff line, based on the estimated error in the light exam. According
to Edgeworth, the replacement of the fine-grained examination with such a
weighted lottery would not significantly decrease (in the long run) the amount
of good candidates being admitted to the program, and further it would have
two benefits:
1. It would mitigate the sense of injustice felt by those candidates who,
under the examination method, would score just under the cutoff line.
2. It would alert the public to the random component of examination
scores.
Boyle develops and refines Edgeworth’s proposal in a series of steps. The
first step is to consider in some detail two desiderata of selection mechanisms:
efficiency and fairness. These are also key desiderata for a science funding
mechanism. Boyle’s definitions are:
Efficiency At its simplest form, efficiency is the achievement of maximal
beneficial outcome for minimal cost. Boyle gives an example of reducing
post-natal infant mortality (Carpenter, 1983): the health organisations
measured various indicators of infant risk, combined them to a single
measure, and directed extra care to those infants who scored above the
12
“care line”. This policy successfully reduced infant mortality rates, and
can therefore count as efficient.
Fairness Boyle, while admitting the complexity of the concept of fairness,
adopts Elster’s working definition of fairness, of treating relevantly
like cases alike (Elster, 1989). Boyle, following Elster, elaborates four
criteria for fairness in the selection of people:
1. The selection process should minimise wasted effort by applicants,
e.g. by not requiring information which is superfluous or irrelevant,
by not demanding extensive travel etc.
2. The selection process should not make a clear cutoff between can-
didates whose measurable difference is not statistically significant,
e.g. due to random error in measurement scores.
3. The selection process should avoid bias, both intentional and
unintentional, e.g. sexism or racism, but also “heightism” or
“hairism”.
4. The selection process should be free from corruption.
Note that none of these criteria relate to relevant differences; According to
Boyle’s account, a system which treats all candidates exactly alike would be
considered fair, though it will probably be inefficient. For example, under
Boyle’s account, if candidate A has some demonstrable and relevant qualities
that are better than candidate B’s, but A failed to score significantly higher
than B on the chosen test (which assumedly checks for these, and other,
qualities), it would not be unfair if B is consequently picked for the position
instead of A, though it might have been more efficient if A was picked instead
of B.
While the drive for efficiency is often internal to the organisation, there are
often external drivers for fairness, including laws (e.g. against discrimination),
and public scrutiny of selection results (either via high profile cases or via
published statistics). In the case of science funding it seems the drive for
efficiency would also be external, e.g. from Congress in the case of US funding
bodies. It seems reasonable to generalise here and say that when individuals
are selected for some productive roles, the issue of fairness will be of concern
among the population applying for these roles (and their extended social
circle) and the issue of efficiency will be of concern to those who are positioned
to benefit from the products of labour. In Boyle’s case the products of labour
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are enjoyed by the organisation performing the selection, whereas in the
(public) science funding case the products of labour are enjoyed by society.
Boyle proposes the following example of how a lottery might have been
introduced into a selection mechanism to make it more fair. In the old British
grammar school system, an IQ test, called the eleven plus test, was given to
students at age eleven, and the high scorers in each local education authority
would be given places in the more academically-oriented grammar schools.
The eleven plus IQ test was considered the most reliable predictor of the
five-year academic success of students out of the available measures, though
it was known to be imperfect. Initially, a “border zone” near the cutoff score
for admittance was created, and children who scored in the “border zone”
were further evaluated using teacher reports and other information. Over
time, probably for administrative reasons, the border zone was shrunk. Boyle
claims that the border zone should not have been shrunk, and if anything,
it should have been expanded. He claims the border zone should be set
according to the possible error in the test: marking errors account for 1%
error rate, repeatability errors (children’s performance varying on different
sittings) account for 10% error rate, and prediction errors (the test not
correctly predicting academic performance) account for 15% error rate, and in
total Boyle arrives at a 26% error rate. Given a normal distribution of results,
and admittance rates to grammar schools of 25%, this yields a “border zone”
of 40% of students, those who scored in the top 45% but excluding the top
5%.11 From this, Boyle suggests the following:
1. Automatically admit the top 5%, who performed significantly better
than the other candidates.
2. Automatically reject the bottom 55% percent, who performed signifi-
cantly worse than the other candidates, and where there is a very small
chance they scored below the cutoff line by mistake.
3. For the remaining 40%, perform a “graduated” lottery, such that 3/4 of
the lowest 10% are chosen at random and joined with the second-lowest
10%, from these 3/4 are chosen and joined with the second-highest 10%,
and so forth until in the end only half the candidates remain, forming
11The similarity between Boyle’s numbers and the numbers of Graves et al. is largely
accidental, arising mostly from the similar arbitrary cutoff percentages of 25% and 21%,
respectively. Nonetheless, the similarity is convenient for translating, at least as a mental
exercise, from one context to the other.
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20% of the original population, and together with the 5% who were
selected automatically they form the admittance quota of 25%.
According to Boyle, this mechanism will have the following advantages:
1. A lottery is quick, cheap, and random, reducing both the direct cost to
the applicant (compared with, say, more testing) and the indirect costs
by reducing the incentive to spend extra effort on the test (i.e. reduce
the motivation to slightly exaggerate one’s own abilities).
2. From the point of view of the candidates, a lottery is fairer, as it treats
those who are not distinguishable in a statistically significant manner
as the same.
3. While no process could be completely free from bias, a lottery gives
every candidate, whatever their public standing, a non-zero, measurable
chance of success. This is true regardless of any particular anti-bias
mechanisms that are in fashion at the time.
4. A publicly visible lottery is, to a large extent, free from corruption, as
no individual has power over the direct outcome. Bureaucrats without
taint of corruption may be even better, but they are hard to come by
and expensive to maintain.
5. A lottery could reduce the costs the organisation spends on proving to
external parties the selection mechanism is fair.
6. A lottery may benefit the organisation by occasionally introducing into
the selection pool candidates who have rare and valuable skills which
are not picked up by the test.
Boyle’s argument can be applied, with some modification, to the context
of project selection for science funding, though some key differences must be
remembered:
1. In the science funding scenario the selection is among project proposals,
not people. Nonetheless, the decision does directly influence the lives of
the researchers associated with each proposal, and so considerations of
fairness and psychological effect on participants have their place.
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2. If we adopt a society-wide perspective, it is both more efficient and
more fair to pick the projects of highest merit, because merit takes into
account the information needs of the entire population. Nonetheless,
when comparing mechanisms of equal ability to generate scientific value,
the mechanism that is more fair on the participating scientists would
be preferred.
3. There is currently no good estimate of the predictive power, and the
related error or uncertainty, of the proposal evaluation process, though
the arguments and models in the literature suggest it will be large. A
significant portion of the error or uncertainty in evaluating proposals
may be ineliminable, because the information required simply does not
exist at the time of evaluation, as the information demands and values
of the society change. Nonetheless, we can use the measurements of
variability discussed in §1 as a guideline for setting up the “border zone”
for grant proposals.
2.1.1 Criticisms and responses to Boyle’s paper
Boyle’s paper was published alongside comments from various experts, includ-
ing moral philosophers, statisticians, an occupational psychologist responsible
for entry examination tests, an administrator of school examinations, a mar-
keting expert, and an insurance expert.
A common criticism, both from statisticians and examination adminis-
trators, was that a lottery would more often substitute a truly meritorious
applicant with a less meritorious applicant than would a test. This was consid-
ered an important shortcoming in efficiency, but also considered to be unjust
from the point of view of the more meritorious applicant. The statistical
details of this argument were in effect identical between the commentators,
and can be exemplified in the following model: label the real value, which
precisely predicts the performance of candidate i, as Ti, and the test result
score for that candidate as ti. The error in the test for that candidate is
then ei = Ti − ti. For a well-designed test, this error will be random rather
then systematic, which means it will be normally distributed around a mean
value of 0.12 Thus, if we compare two candidates, the error in the test would
12When the long term achievements of candidates are measurable, as in the case of
the IQ test and academic achievement, the tests can be tested for systematic errors, and
correction mechanisms which may include some randomisation are sometimes included,
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equally apply to both, and the likelihood that the higher scoring candidate
will be the better achieving one is greater. The outcome of the test may not
be fair, as the test results of one candidate may be higher than the results
of another candidate of equal-merit, and lead to the first candidate getting
the job; however, both candidates were admitted to the same process, and
were equally subjected to the same probability of error. The potential error
in the test in fact serves as a kind of lottery, which operates on top of the
main function of the test, which is to predict performance.
Boyle responds to this criticism by first agreeing that merely adding a
purely random score to the test scores of candidates would serve no beneficial
purpose. However, he defends the graduated lottery on three grounds:
Non-linearity The criticism assumes that higher test scores correspond to
higher achievements throughout the range of scores, i.e. that the test
score is linearly dependant on the real value. However, Boyle claims,
there is evidence that, for example in the case of IQ, beyond a certain
threshold higher scores no longer predict higher achievement, even if
the test succeeds in making predictions for lower scores. Thus, even
if the test is reliable when the entire range is considered, if the cutoff
score is higher than or near to the point of non-linearity, the criticism
no longer holds, since within the new border area the test is no longer
a good differentiator of candidates.
In the science funding case, unlike the case of IQ tests, there is no
evidence of reliability for any range of scores, and so worries regarding
non-linearity are expected to be even more relevant.
Systematic bias Boyle argues that the test is likely to be designed to pick
up a few traits which are strongly correlated with success, while ignoring
a range of other, more rare or difficult to measure traits. This introduces
two possible sources of systematic bias, which, if not directly controlled
for, could undermine the efficiency argument:
• The key traits tested for may be more easily detected in a certain
subset of the population, leading to unfair treatment by the test, e.g.
e.g. in the order of the questions. As discussed earlier in the chapter, there is no good
mechanisms for empirically uncovering general systemic bias in peer review results. Where
specific biases are detected, e.g anti-novelty bias (Boudreau et al., 2016), measures can be
taken to address them, but that still leaves the possibility of further undetected biases.
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logic questions relying on a certain level of linguistic comprehension
which favours native speakers even if the job does not require
language skills. As mentioned, effective comparison of test results
with later performance can help screen for such bias, but only if
such comparison is carried out in an effective manner, and if the
measures of performance themselves are free of bias.
As discussed above, there are at present no good measures for
eliminating systematic bias from grant peer review, because there
are no good ex post indicators, and because no data could be had
on the success of unfunded projects (as opposed to the academic
success of children who went to less-academic schools). Studies
measuring the performance of particular minority groups in grant
peer review do exist, and detected biases sometimes lead to the
establishment of dedicated funding pools, though this tends to be
very controversial.
• The unmeasured traits which can lead to success may be nega-
tively correlated to the measured traits, e.g. if a deficiency in a
key trait provides the necessary motivation to develop rare skills.
For example, creative “out of the box” thinking, which can be
valuable in certain problem-solving situations, is often suppressed
among individuals who are very proficient in specific analytic, semi-
algorithmic problem solving skills. A test for the latter kind of
skills will be biased against those candidates who are strong in the
former set.
Similarly, in the science case, highly innovative thinking may be
correlated to low evaluation based on the prevailing “paradigm”,
as argued by Gillies.
In both cases of bias, the criticism that tests are better than lotteries
at selecting the best candidates is undermined because we have reason
to suspect that the “error” in the test is not normally distributed for
all individuals in the population, the test is therefore not an “effective
lottery”, and its claim to fair treatment of all candidates is undermined.
More blatant cases of bias could also be counted here, such as bribery
and overt racism and sexism (as opposed to hidden biases that result
from the choice of evaluative criteria).
Diversity As mentioned in some of the comments on the paper, one of the
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possible advantages of a lottery over a test is to promote diversity, by
preventing “cloning” of existing candidates. This is not a comment
about fairness, but a comment about efficiency: it is better for the
organisation to have a more diverse workforce, to allow diverse thinking
and learning. This efficiency consideration, which takes into account the
cohort of recruits as a whole, is different from the efficiency consideration
of the test, which is only a measure of how well the test predicts
the performance of individual candidates and supports good selection
decisions based on these individual predictions. Thus, the argument goes,
to maximise efficiency it is good to have mechanisms that address both
aspects of efficiency (individual-level and group-level), and a lottery
serves group-level efficiency better than a test would, by increasing
diversity.
This argument by Boyle is directly supported by models of science
funding, and bears very strong resemblance to Gillies’ argument against
the homogeneity-inducing effects of peer review.
Another criticism, presented by Goodwin, argued that by the logic of the
argument, and given the long tail of error distributions, all applicants should
be admitted to a graduated lottery. This argument is a local and restricted
version of Goodwin’s more general advocacy for the use of lotteries as means
to advance fairness and justice (Goodwin, 2005). According to Goodwin,
there are three reasons for admitting all candidates to a weighted lottery:
1. For every candidate submitted to the test there is some chance that their
score does not reflect their true merit, either because of marking error,
or because the test is not well-designed. Specifically, for candidates
scoring just outside Boyle’s “border zone”, there is a good chance that
their true merit is very close to those who scored just within the “border
zone”, and therefore they should be admitted to the lottery as well.
This argument can be repeated until all candidates are admitted to the
lottery.
2. From certain justice perspectives, no one should be barred from success
ab initio due to lack of talent.13 In a weighted lottery, no matter how
bad your chances are, you have at least some chance of winning.
13This is not true for all perspectives of justice. More about how lotteries fit with various
perspectives of justice and fairness is available in Goodwin (2005); Saunders (2008).
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3. If, as Boyle argues, it is useful to be aware of the chance element in
testing and selection, would not all candidates, rather than just the
borderline candidates, benefit from this awareness? The beneficial effect
of restricting the pride of winners and the despondency of losers should
be applied to all.
Goodwin’s criticism focuses entirely on issues of fairness and justice. This
makes sense in the context of an education system, as education is often
considered a mechanism for advancing social justice and fairness, e.g. in
providing equal opportunities. The applicability of such arguments to the
science funding case is more limited. For purely pragmatic reasons a restricted
lottery in a border zone seems more efficient, especially if the border zone
is small enough to be treated with a simple (equal chance) lottery instead
of a graduated lottery. However, experience with the system in practice will
provide further insight into the differences between a border-zone lottery and
a full lottery, and this paper does not reject the viability of a full lottery as a
potential allocation mechanism. After all, if it can be shown that the cohorts
selected by a full lottery perform no worse than cohorts selected by peer-review
or border-zone lottery, then the cost-saving and fairness advantages of a full
lottery will tip the balance in its favour.
2.2 The economics of distributing goods by a lottery
Boyce (1994) challenges the notion that when lotteries are chosen in real-
world scenarios over other distribution mechanisms it is because of their
fairness. He claims that in many real life situations many members of the
community are excluded from participating in a given lottery, and furthermore
a discriminatory fee is often required to participate in the lottery. These
conditions, he argues, undermine many lotteries’ claim to fairness. However,
he argues, agents have reasons to prefer lotteries over other distribution
mechanisms for purely self-interested reasons. His argument presents a
mathematical formalism of distribution by lottery, which is compared to three
other candidate distribution mechanisms: auctions, queues, and measurements
of merit. As will be shown below, allocation by peer review bears some




First, Boyce establishes the condition for optimal distribution. Assume we
have k homogeneous goods to be distributed among N people. These people
will place some value on the goods, which could then be ordered to give a
ranking of utilities, say from v1 for the highest value to vN for the lowest.
In the most efficient allocation, the goods will go to those who value them
the most, yielding an overall utility of
∑k
i=1 vi. Boyce notes, however, that
the satisfaction of those members of the group who receive the goods is only
one aspect of the efficiency of a distribution mechanism. The other aspect,
according to Boyce, is in communal rebate. If the k goods are provided
from some collective pool, it may be preferable to require payment from the
members who received the goods. This payment could then be distributed
back to the community.
Boyce’s analysis relies heavily on the value individuals place on the good
(in our case, the research grant). This is not the case in science funding, where
the measure of a good distribution is one that maximises contribution to well-
being via the products of research, not one that maximises the satisfaction
of the desire of scientists for grant moneys. Keeping this clear distinction
in mind, it is worthwhile to consider the issue of consumption in the science
funding case for two reasons:
• We may consider whether there is any correlation between the con-
sumption utility of a research grant for a particular scientist, and the
likelihood of that scientist’s project resulting in a significant contribu-
tion to well-being, i.e. whether individuals how are highly motivated to
do research end up producing better research.
• If two funding mechanisms are equally good at generating contributions
to well-being, we may prefer the mechanism that better satisfies the
desires of participating scientists, assuming other secondary desiderata,
such as fairness, being equal.
2.2.2 Distribution by auction
The go-to economic mechanism for the distribution of goods is an auction. As
a well-studied distribution mechanism, auctions serve as a good benchmark
for other distribution mechanisms, such as lotteries. According to Boyce, in a
k price auction of k homogeneous goods, the goods will sell for some market
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value vk. There will be k people who are willing to pay this market price,
because they value the goods more than the market price, vi ≥ vk; label these
people group A. Each member of group A has a consumer benefit of vi − vk,
leading to a total benefit of (
∑k
i=1 vi)− kvk, while the other members of the
population, the ones who value the good less than its market value, have no
benefit. However, the auction’s earnings could be rebated to the community,
in which case, assuming equal rebate, there will be a further individual benefit
for all members (including members of group A) equal to kvk/N . Note that
for large communities (N  k) this benefit vanishes.
An analogous system to an auction in the science funding case would
be if scientists had to make certain promises about future utilisation of the
funds in order to win them, the grants going to those scientists who promised
the most. In this case, the scientists would “pay” for the grants with their
time and labour, and this “payment” will be distributed to society via the
impact of their research. The highly uncertain and dynamic nature of science
significantly undermines the viability of this option, because the “payment”
offered by scientists cannot be predicted or evaluated accurately in advance.
In such a “promise competition” there would be a clear incentive to exag-
gerate what one can deliver, with clear harmful consequences. In fact, since
proposals in peer review are evaluated as a hybrid of researcher credentials,
project details, and expected impact, some element of auction (in the form of
promise competition), and motivation for exaggerated promise, already exists
in the current peer review system.14
A good measure against exaggeration would be to penalise scientists who
did not deliver on their promises. However, due to the highly uncertain nature
of research such penalisation is likely to be dished out to scientists who gave
their honest best estimate. Furthermore, penalisation could, in the long run,
result in more risk-averse proposals, to the detriment of the entire enterprise.
Unless other solutions could be found, an auction-like mechanism seems to
be ruled out for science funding.15
14The issue of exaggerated promises by scientists and the harm caused by the resulting
unrealistic expectations is discussed in several of the papers collected by Irwin and Wynne
(1996).
15An alternative auction-like mechanism, where scientists compete by proposing sensible
cost-saving mechanisms in order to win grants, would possibly help as a one-off exercise to
curtail inflating expenses such as instrumentation costs. However, it is not likely to be a
sustainable allocation mechanism.
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2.2.3 Distribution by queue or evaluation of earned merit
According to Boyce, in a queue or merit system, the k individuals who value
the goods the most will need to spend resources by an amount close to vk in
order to win the goods. The kind of queue discussed here is a first-comes-first-
served mechanism, where individuals can spend resources (waking up earlier,
sleeping by the venue the night before) to improve their chances of winning
the goods. From an economics perspective, this mechanism’s operation is
indistinguishable from a merit evaluation system, if we assume a merit system
where the individuals are able to expend resources in order to gain merit. A
queue has a similar individual efficiency performance as an auction, because
k individuals win the goods by “giving up” vk worth of resources. However,
queues are less efficient from a community perspective, since the cost paid
by participants is dissipated (lost) in the case of queues, without leaving the
possibility of communal rebate.
The issue of the expected utilisation of research funds rules out a first-
comes-first-served queue model for science funding. Given the evidence
presented in §1, that extra time spent on a proposal does not correlate with
higher likelihood of success, it is unlikely that Boyce’s system of earned merit
is a good model of science funding applications, though at a coarse grained
level we may say that the high time investment involved in grant applications
leads to self-selection amongst scientists. There is, however, no clear reason
to believe that the scientists most able and motivated to spend significant
time on grant applications are those most likely to maximise utilisation of
grants.
In addition, in the science funding case there may be a further considera-
tion, which is the advantage, both to applicants and reviewers, of participating
in the review process. For the applicants, these benefits include constructive
criticism from experts in their fields who they might not have access to
otherwise, and, arguably, a more honest opinion of their proposal allowed by
the anonymity of the review process. As to reviewers, the process grants them
access to a comprehensive snapshot of the research agenda in their field, which
is fuller than the picture derived from the list of accepted proposals (which
is often made public), and timelier than the published record due to the
duration of research and delays in the publication process itself. Furthermore,
being a member of a review panel grants the reviewers prestige as experts
in their field, and provides them with tacit knowledge about the workings of
the system which might help the chances of their own proposals or those of
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their colleagues. Having said that, it is not clear that these advantages are
significant when compared to issues of utilisation and cost, or even desirable,
nor is it clear that these benefits cannot be captured in other distribution
systems, or via pathways outside the distribution mechanism.
2.2.4 Distribution by lottery
First, Boyce establishes that lotteries are not efficient, in the sense that they do
not maximise overall utility. For now, assume the lottery is non-transferable,
i.e. winners cannot sell their winnings to other members of the community.
The overall utility yield will be the average utility multiplied by the number
of goods, kE(v). It is easy to see that this quantity is always smaller or equal
to the optimal utility presented above, and it is only equal when everyone
values the goods the same.
Boyce then extends his analysis to a consideration of community rebate
in the lottery case. If the lottery requires that participants pay a fixed,
non-refundable fee F , the number of participants in the lottery, n, will be
determined such that the last person to participate is indifferent between the
expected value of the lottery and the fee, F = (k/n)vn. All participants other
than the last have positive expected utility, as vi ≥ vn for all i < n. Define
group B as those n− k individuals who would participate in a lottery, but
would not pay the market price in an auction of the same goods (note that
their number, but not their identities, is the same as those who participate in
the lottery and lose). For everyone in group B, vk > vi ≥ vn. Thus, if the fee
was set equal to vk, the lottery would become equivalent to an auction. Like
an auction, a lottery can also implement a rebate, where the earnings from
the fees are redistributed back to the community. In the absence of rebate,
all members of group B would prefer a lottery to an auction, as it gives them
a positive expected utility.
Now consider the case of a transferable lottery, where winners are allowed
to sell their winnings to another member of the community. All community
members outside of group A will, upon winning the lottery, end up selling
their winning to a member of group A. Thus, a transferable lottery encourages
speculating, and the number of participants in a transferable lottery will be
greater than the number of participants in a non-transferable lottery.
First, let us consider the issue of transferability in the science case. In
Boyce’s analysis the goods are non-monetary and the agents obtain them
with money, whereas in the science funding case the goods are composed of
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a significant monetary element (as well as some non-monetary perks) and
the scientists obtain them by writing proposals, a process which dissipates
their time. Collaborations aside, scientists do not seem particularly interested
in obtaining each other’s time, making transferability problematic. I will
therefore consider only non-transferable lotteries as possible science funding
mechanisms.
Now, consider the possibility of participation fees and community rebate
in the science funding case. Currently, research proposals have little value
for anyone except, perhaps, their author, and so there is no possibility of
rebate (as is common in merit evaluation systems). In order to consider
possible rebate mechanisms, the time spent competing for grants needs to be
replaced with an activity that achieves something of value to the community,
for example contribution of time and experience to the education system
or relevant industries, or mentoring young researchers. If mixed with some
light checking mechanisms (e.g. those proposed by Gillies (2014); Fang and
Casadevall (2016)), we get a system that guarantees some minimal level
of utilisation, reduces lost costs (by reducing the time wasted on detailed
applications), introduces rebate (in the form of ”participation fees”) and,
according to Boyce’s analysis, increases participation.
3 Design of a possible science lottery policy
The previous section presented two theoretical approaches to the use of
lotteries, and each could be, with some modification, applied to the case
of science funding. Another important lesson from the works presented in
the previous section is the importance of small details that can make a big
difference between two setups that could both be called “lotteries”. This
section presents a sketch of one possible design of a lottery mechanism for
distributing research grants; this sketch is made in order to highlight the
various considerations that are involved in the design of a science funding
policy.
3.1 Organise panels by epistemic activities
Selection of applicants depends on the skill set required of the applicant, and
on the similarity of the proposed project to previously attempted projects.
Both of these judgements, of required skills and of similarity to past projects,
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require knowledge of a specific area of science. Thus, it makes sense to
have the funding mechanism operated by multiple sub-organisations, each
responsible for a specific area of research, in a similar manner to the different
funding panels within the US National Science Foundation (NSF). However,
due to the dynamic nature of research, this structure should be subjected to
constant revision, as new areas emerge and old areas diminish in significance.
Based on the expert knowledge required, it makes sense to assign panels
according to different epistemic activities (Chang, 2012), rather than, say,
academic disciplines or addressed social need, as communities engaged in a
particular epistemic activity are best positioned to accumulate and access
knowledge regarding the relevant skill set and similar past projects. Examples
of epistemic activities in this context include the design of computational
models of climate systems, the construction of optical tools (such as optical
tweezers) for the study of biological and chemical colloids, and the observation
of particular species in their natural habitats. In this, I accept some aspects
of Polanyi’s arguments regarding science funding (Polanyi, 1962), stemming
from the role of tacit knowledge in epistemic activities, though in general
the mechanism proposed here significantly differs from the peer review he
defends, as discussed below.
3.2 Initial filter by fair and public criteria
Scientific activity is highly specialised. As such, most members of society
would not make good utilisation of science grants. Luckily, scientific activity,
and especially scientific training, is also highly codified, in university courses,
postdoc programs, and counting of publications and citations. While each of
these codified practices has limitations as a measure of ability, combinations
of indicators could offer a range of tools for individual panels to create fair and
public criteria required to submit a funding application. For example, some
panels may require a PhD from a set of recognised institutes, others may add
a requirement for a certain number of publications in a set of relevant journals,
etc. When drafting these requirements, it is important that elements of chance
and bias (e.g. in getting a publication) are remembered, and to the extent
that this is possible multiple alternative routes are offered for candidates to
meet the criteria. Furthermore, the discussions about requirements should
take place openly and frequently within the active community pursuing the
system of practice, and should preferably focus on the minimal set of evidence
that can guarantee the applicant has the minimal skill set required to pursue
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research in the area.
There are two main reasons for focusing on the minimal set of skills, as
opposed to a desired set of skills or an evaluation of skill to go along the
evaluation of the proposal:
1. All else being equal, a broader admission into the system will increase
fairness and representation, and will increase the likelihood of the lottery
admitting unorthodox individuals with unorthodox ideas.
2. Given current tools and understanding, our ability to state exactly, in
advance, what the required skill set would be is limited, and our ability
to measure those skills even more limited.
There is insufficient space here to defend the second point, but in brief, it is
the result of the following considerations:
• Scientific activity, starting with funding and ending with publication of
results, is extremely heterogeneous, requiring, among others, technical
skills, cognitive skills, interpersonal skills, managements skills, emotional
resilience, creativity, and discipline.
• Some of these skills are measurable, but such measurements (e.g. in
the screening of candidates for high-rank positions in the Israeli army,
including non-combatant positions) can be very costly, requiring a
trained psychologist to spend several intensive days with the candidate
while the candidate performs various tasks in special test facilities.
• Many of these skills are difficult the operationalise, as there are different
views about what these skills mean and how they are manifest.
• Some skills are often latent, only made manifest in rare situations that
are hard to recreate in a test environment.
• Some skills may change over time, due to personal development, personal
trauma, or other sources; significantly, the change may occur during
the length of a research project, which is often measured in years.
• The strength of some of these skills may be highly situation-dependant,
relying less on the individual and more on the physical or social context
of the lab, such that they should not serve as a basis for selection.16
16This point about situation-dependent personal traits bears strong resemblance to the
situationist account of moral character presented by Doris (2002).
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• The relevance of some of these skills depends on the specific nature of
the research project, but there is high uncertainty about the precise
nature of the project ex ante, at the point of proposal evaluation.
Despite all the above limitations, it is hard to argue that there are no cases
of robust high ability in individual scientists. Such cases are given special
consideration in the proposal, as discussed below. If further evidence suggests
there really are no such cases, or that it is better to craft policies as if there
are no such cases, these special provisions may be dropped.
3.3 Use short proposals to locate projects in the space
of possible projects
Uncertainty is inherent to scientific research. Therefore, it makes no sense,
neither for accountability nor for efficiency, to ask candidates for detailed
research plans. Still, not all projects are identical; history tells us that some
projects yield great benefits to society and further research, others less so. As
a compromise, it makes sense to ask candidates for short project descriptions,
that associate the project with the panel it is submitted to, that outline
the perceived potential of the project, and that detail its similarity to past
projects, or lack thereof.
Such proposals should serve four purposes, and no other:
• Validate that the project was assigned to the right panel, and if necessary
refer it to another panel.
• Further validate that the applicant is minimally conversant in the
knowledge of the field, and outright reject applications from candidates
which are not. This should be done carefully however, as radically novel
proposals (proposals that lie outside the “vision range” of the panel
members) may appear at first incomprehensible or incompetent.
• Locate, as accurately as possible, the proposal within the best estimate
of the epistemic landscape of the domain. This largely involves drawing
analogies to similar past projects and their revealed impact, and some
extrapolation into the future of the field and the expected impact of the
proposed project. Since information provided in the proposal is slim,
the assignment should be rough, into groups of “known high merit”,
“known medium merit”, “known low merit” and “unknown merit”. It
28
might be possible to introduce graduation within the unknown merit
group as well, if the distinction between known and unknown is done
on a scale rather than as a sharp distinction.
• Contribute to the detection of rare cases of exceptional talent, where
the application should be funded outright.17 Preferably, the main
bulk of the detection of exceptional talent should occur outside of the
funding exercise, e.g. via international competitions, or if a talented
individual successfully solves a “hard nut”, a long-unsolved problem in
the discipline, or if they are able to make a significant and recognisable
novel contribution without guidance or financial aid. If these signs are
not detected prior to the funding exercise, a research proposal may
indicate either of the last two, and panel members would be allowed
to inquire further into such cases. Either way, this would only capture
a small subset of as-yet-undetected talent, as one reviewer noticed. In
cases where individuals have already demonstrated exceptional talent
through a major contribution there should be, and are, available funding
streams outside the lottery to support them.
3.4 Triage proposals, using a lottery for the middle
group
The assignment of expected value, based on the location of the project in the
space of possible projects, is used to triage the proposals:
1. All proposals of known high merit should be funded. Based on the
results of Graves et al. (§1.1), this would account for about 10% of
proposals, though of course some variation is expected over time and
between fields.
2. Proposals of known medium merit and proposals of unknown merit
should be placed in a lottery. If graduation is used for the unknown
merit group, a graduated lottery may be used accordingly, in a similar
manner to Boyle’s graduated lottery.
17Examples of cases where short texts were sufficient to detect exceptional talent include
Hardy’s recognition of Ramanujan, and Russell’s recognition of Wittgenstein. However,
the false positive rate for such cases may be quite high, and therefore selection via this
process should be preferably combined with other indications of exceptional talent, and
the performance of selected individuals should be monitored.
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3. All proposals of known low merit should be rejected. Based on Graves
et al. this would account for 50-60%.
Further fine details should be considered:
• The lottery should be carried out publicly, and the random selection
mechanism should be open to scrutiny.
• Authors of applications which have been scored as known low merit
should be informed of the past projects which have been relied upon to
make the judgement.
• If there are not enough funds to fund all projects of known high merit,
e.g. in the early stages following a major breakthrough, it may be
preferable to hold back and only select a significant portion of these
proposals (by lottery). This will allow non-paradigmatic research (the
unknown merit group) a chance of funding, and will also help prevent
over-specialisation of the domain. The high merit projects which are left
unfunded in that particular round are likely to be funded in near-future
consecutive rounds, when more fine-grained information will be available
about the epistemic landscape near the high merit peak.
3.5 Managing potential outcomes of introducing a lot-
tery
There may be initial upheaval following the introduction of random selection
into a hitherto fully decision-based selection mechanism, either from scientists
themselves, or from the general public and its representatives about the
apparent misuse of public money. This may be counteracted by communicating
the message that uncertainty in research is ineliminable, and a limited lottery
has a good chance of yielding better results for society in the long run.18
Two expected objections to the proposal are related to waste: one worry
is about an increase in the number of low-quality proposals funded, the
other worry is that a lottery may encourage malicious abuse of the system,
i.e. applicants submitting off-hand proposals, winning by lottery, and then
18At least as far as philosophers of science (and the few scientists) who attend philosophy
of science conferences are concerned, there seems to be no serious upheaval upon hearing the
proposal, though of course the reactions to ex cathedra arguments may differ significantly
from reactions to the real thing.
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wasting the funds. First, it is important to note that even under the current
system there are projects that lead nowhere, and scientists who misuse public
funds. Second, both worries can be mitigated by follow-up monitoring post-
funding by the funding agency, especially of projects funded by lottery, e.g. by
requiring annual reports and utilising occasional spot checks of laboratories.
If the will and funds could be mustered, this exercise could be extended
from a mere policing effort to a continual communication and a positive
supporting role the funding body could offer the researchers they fund, a role
they are particularly suited for, given their connections to field experts and
their knowledge of the current research portfolio.
Finally, a serious concern is that projects have high set-up costs, and that
the regular freezing and unfreezing of projects that can be expected under a
lottery system will be highly inefficient. This concern is somewhat lessened
by the triage element, as proposals for continuation are likely to have known
merit, and therefore if that merit is high they would be funded without a
lottery, and if that merit is not high then perhaps the loss is not so great.
Furthermore, best practices could be devised for documentation, facility swap,
and skill transfer, so that the costs of freezing and unfreezing projects is
lowered.
4 When should a lottery not be used
The argument for a lottery relies on various assumptions about the nature
of research. It is possible that in certain domains these assumptions do not
hold, and therefore allocation of research funds by lottery will not be a good
method. Such domains might be identified by the kind of projects being
proposed, or by the kind of discipline in which projects are proposed. This
section looks at some of these scenarios.
4.1 Very expensive projects
The lottery mechanism was designed with a certain (common) project size
in mind: projects that last anywhere from one year to seven years, and cost
in the range of tens of thousands of dollars to a few million dollars per year.
In contrast, some science/engineering mega-projects, such as the Human
Genome Project, cost much more per year and last for a much longer time.
There are several reasons why it might not be beneficial to include such
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mega-projects in a lottery system:
1. Mega projects require sustained funding over a long period of time. It
is not immediately obvious how this could be guaranteed under the
lottery system. For example, if a single lottery win locks funding for a
mega-project for its entire duration, and in a short span of time many
mega-projects win the lottery, then the funding pool will be tied down
to these projects, crowding out all non-mega-projects in the funding
pool, and the lottery’s advantages of innovation and responsiveness will
be lost. If, on the other hand, mega-projects would require sequential
lottery wins for sustained support, we run the risk of wasting significant
funds on partial projects.19
2. Mega projects often combine a multitude of sub-projects, some of which
are purely scientific/exploratory and many others which are purely
engineering. A top down approach has been shown to produce useful
results in the management of large-scale engineering projects, and so
it may be more efficient to submit only the exploratory scientific sub-
projects to a lottery within the general budget of the mega-project
(though see discussion of bounded uncertainty below).
3. Decisions to fund mega-projects often take into consideration factors
that have been largely neglected in this paper, such as job creation,
national pride and/or international cooperation, and excitement and
encouragement of individuals to engage with science and scientific
careers. These factors place such decisions quite visibly on the political
agenda of local and national policy makers, who are in a position to
make a justifiable decision on matters of relatively low-uncertainty, such
as job creation (at least, in this they can outperform a lottery).
4.2 Bounded uncertainty
In certain cases the inherent uncertainty of research is less relevant to project
choice because the range of possible projects is bounded by some external
constraint. For example, the research may be focused on producing a certain
tool or answering a certain question within a given (short) timeframe, e.g.
19Current funding practices also sometimes fail in providing sustained support for mega-
projects, for example the partially-funded Superconducting Supercollider in the USA.
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research into an ongoing epidemic. In such types of research the framing of
the project prevents any significant exploration of uncertainties or open-ended
avenues. In such cases a lottery would not prove beneficial, except possibly as
a time-saving mechanism in prioritising nearly equivalent approaches. Within
the target area of activity for this paper, that of the public support of basic
research, such cases are not the norm.
4.3 Fully explored area
When an area of research is known to be fully explored, the space of possible
projects will be fully visible, and a lottery will be worse than direct selection
of projects. In such cases, however, passive mode peer reviewed applications
would also not be optimal, as the field’s experts have full knowledge of which
are the promising projects, and can simply assign them to the most able
researchers, or allow researchers to compete for them. Note, however, that
such areas are likely to be quickly exhausted, leaving behind a barren epistemic
landscape. It is hard to give an example, due to the inherent fallibility of
all knowledge, but close approximations would be the exploration of the
properties of a specific mathematical body of interest or a specific minimal
axiom system, or tweaking the design of a well known instrument such as the
light microscope, or sifting for novel features of a well explored data set such
as a small viral genome.
4.4 Researcher identity determines scientific impact
The value of a project is a measure of the fit between societal needs and the
causal consequences of the projects’ results. The causal chain that follows the
completion of a project is to some extent determined by the diffusion of the
information, i.e. its acceptance by the scientific community and its spread by
various media. There are many cases where the success of such diffusion of
the information depends on the identity of the investigator who carried out
the research, i.e. their track record, charisma, connections, etc. Thus, the
identity of the investigator affects the causal chain from funding allocation to
research-based activity, and ultimately influences the value of the project’s
results. Following Latour (1987); Kitcher (1993); Goldman (2001), it is clear
that in all areas of research the identity of the researcher has some bearing on
the eventual value of the project, because the researcher’s authority influences
the effect the research will have on society. Nonetheless, the hope is that this
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influence by authority is not the dominant factor, and the actual content of
the result carries more influence on the eventual impact on society’s well-being.
However, it is possible that this is not the case for all fields of science.
In areas where the researcher’s authority strongly determines the value of
the results they produce, a lottery would perform worse than other selection
methods, though so would a peer review system that hides the identity of the
applicant.
Another way the researcher identity could determine impact is if a rare
natural ability or gained skill is required to make advances in the field, for
example an anthropological study of a secluded tribe that requires years of
acclimatisation from both tribe and researcher, or a psychological self-study
by a high functioning individual with a rare mental abnormality. In such
a case a lottery would clearly be a bad choice, unless participation in the
lottery depends on having the required ability or skill.
Conclusion
Theoretical models and arguments have focused on efficiency when suggesting
that random selection may outperform other mechanisms for choosing research
projects. This paper goes beyond the theoretical models and looks at other
desiderata for a funding mechanism, mainly fairness and cost, showing how
they can be taken into account in the design of a lottery-based funding
mechanism. To do this, the paper surveyed existing evidence about the
empirical reliability and costs of science funding exercises, considered issues
of fairness in reference to a case of a lottery in an education setting, and
considered the lottery from the perspective of the applicants using an analysis
from the economics literature. These were all combined to create a more
detailed and nuanced template for science funding by lottery than what exists
in the theoretical literature. Further analysis was presented regarding areas
where a science funding lottery is unlikely to provide benefit, and may instead
cause harm.
Early implementations of random allocation are poised to provide empirical
evidence about the payoffs of funding by lottery and about the reactions
of different stakeholders and publics to the policy. Until such data become
available, and given the heterogeneity of environments in which random
allocation might be implemented, we should continue exploring different ways
to organise scientific activity.
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